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Introduction 
Some  authors  argue  in  favor  of  a  real  exchange  rate  targeting  strategy  for  developing 
countries  (Bresser-Pereira  2004a,  Frenkel  2004).  Relatively  undervalued  exchange  rates 
would  have  been  a  key  factor  in  the  East  Asian  successful  growth  strategies  (Bresser-
Pereira 2004a). Williamson (2003) calls for a development strategy approach to exchange 
rates. According to Rodrik (2000), it would be important to investigate the possible benefic 
consequences of a competitive exchange rate for long-term growth. After mentioning the 
successful  cases  of  Chile  (middle  of  the  80s),  Turkey  (beginning  of  the  80s),  India 
(beginning of the 80s and since 1994), Uganda (since 1986), and Mauritius (middle of the 
80s),  he  concludes  that  the  real  exchange  rate  was  a  fundamental  policy  tool  for  the 
beginning of the growth process. Dornbusch et al (1995) call for policies that keep the real 
exchange rate competitive in order to promote exports and output growth. When discussing 
the events that led to the Mexican crisis in 1995, they argue that avoiding real exchange 
rate appreciations may be one of the most important policy goals in a financially integrated 
world economy.  
Following  the  traditional  macroeconomic  channel,  an  expansionary  devaluation  boosts 
exports, income and employment (Frenkel 2004). Exchange rate management may have 
strong impacts in capital accumulation as it determines paths of consumption, savings and 
investment via real wage determination. An excessively overvalued currency could cause 
savings displacement (Bresser-Pereira 2004a). By stimulating the export sector, a relatively 
undervalued currency can avoid financial crises and put the economy in a more sustained 
developmental path. It is an important tool to promote the development of the tradeable 
sector of an economy, which is usually very dynamic and contributes to innovations and 
productivity increases (Cavallo 1990 and Dollar 1992). Exchange rate policy may also be 
important  in  stimulating  the  tradeable  sector  as  a  means  of  avoiding  Dutch  Disease 
problems (Williamson 2003) and efficiently taking advantage of external savings (Sachs et 
al 1996, 1986). Numerous studies have argued that most cases of balance of payments 
crises are related to overvalued or misaligned currencies (Fajnzylber et al 2002, Goldfajn 
and  Valdes  1998,  Sachs  et  al  1996,  Sachs  1986,  Dornbusch  et  al  1995,  Dollar  1992, 
Cavallo et al 1990).  
There  is  today  a  growing  empirical  literature  that  relates  per  capita  growth  rates  with 
exchange  rate  management  and  misalignment.  Cavallo  et  al  (1990),  Dollar  (1992)  and 
Razin and Collins (1997) find negative correlations between exchange rate misalignment 
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and growth for a long series of developing countries since the 70s; the more undervalued 
the currencies, the greater the per capita growth rates. Benaroya and Janci (1999) show 
evidence  for  developing  countries  in  the  90s  that  confirm  Dollar’s  (1990)  results. 
Acemoglu et al (2002) find similar evidence on the subject. In a work about institutions, 
macro policies and growth within 96 countries from 1970 to 1997 they are not able to reject 
the effect of levels of real exchange rates on per capita income growth for the countries in 
the time span. Fajnzylber et al (2002) get similar results when comparing growth in Latin 
America with other parts of the world for the period 1960-99. As Acemoglu et al (2002), 
they use the overvaluation index constructed by Easterly (2001), which is based on the 
work  of  Dollar  (1992),  and  conclude  that  an  overvalued  currency  can  exert  negative 
influence on growth. After analyzing a total of 80 transitions from low to high growth in 
developing countries since the 60s, Hausman et al (2004) find evidence that undervalued 
exchange rates were an important factor for the beginning of the process. Polterovich and 
Popov (2004) find that exchange rate undervaluation and foreign reserves accumulation are 
positively related to per capita growth rates. 
A recurrent issue in this empirical literature is the relatively undervalued level of the Asian 
currencies when compared to  Latin American and African ones for the period 1970 to 
1999. In most works, a lower currency level for Asian countries emerges, in which appears 
to be a regional pattern. For the Latin American and African cases, the pattern seems to be 
the opposite. Appreciation cycles are constantly showing up, and various studies for Latin 
America point in this direction. Accordingly, a central issue to understand the East and 
Southeast Asian success, as compared to the Latin American and African failures, could be 
found in the way they managed their exchange rate policies and on the evolution of their 
real  exchange  rate  levels.  Following  the  discussion,  the  objective  of  this  paper  is  to 
compare the evolution of real exchange rate levels in Asia and Latin America from 1970 to 
1999.  The  work  reviews  some  aspects  of  exchange  rate  management  for  some  of  the 
countries of these regions based on a survey of case studies. It also presents an evolution of 
real exchange rate levels against the US dollar for a set of 20 countries based on the World 
Bank data set (Easterly 2001) and on an exchange rate distortion index.  
The  text  is  divided  in  4  sections  and  an  introduction.  Section  2  discusses  cycles  of 
appreciations in Latin America in the 70s, 80s and 90s, concentrating itself on the well 
known cases of economic populism in the 70s and 80s and on the aspects of the exchange 
rate policies of the most important stabilization plans of the 90s in Latin America: Mexico, 
Argentina and Brasil. Section 3 deals with the East Asian experiences and the export-led 
growth strategy followed by Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore since the 
70s, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand since the 80s and, more recently, China. Section 4 
presents some tendencies for real exchange rate behavior for countries of both regions and 
section 5 offers some conclusions. The main focus of the paper will be on exchange rate 
levels, meaning a departure from most of the literature in the area, which is worried with 
the regime choice discussion.   3 
Appreciation cycles in Latin America 
After the debt crisis in the beginning of the 80s, Latin America’s growth record became 
very disapointing, especially when  compared to the post-war period. Countries such  as 
Brazil and Mexico that used to show very high and stable per capita gorwth rates went 
through a stop and go process that lasts until today. With the possible exception of Chile, 
the performance of Latin American countries in the 80s and 90s fell short of the historical 
record. Debt defaults, balance of payment crises and chronic inflationary processes were 
rather common for almost all of the countries in the region, especially in the last 20 years. 
Exchange rate overvaluations and fiscal indiscipline were basic ingredients in their recent 
economic  history,  especially  when  compared  to  East  Asian  countries’  history.  Latin 
American countries became well known for a tradition of economic populism and inflation 
stabilization plans. 
The concept of economic populism differs from its correlate in political science, which 
usually refers to the case of charismatic leaders, ruling close to the masses without political 
parties’ intermediation. Governments that promote massive fiscal deficits as a consequence 
of salaries being paid above productivity levels or that use real exchange rate overvaluation 
as a means of raising real wages would be incurring in economic populism. Welfare of the 
workers is raised in the short run with political objectives in sight, without taking into 
account  the  possible  negative  outcomes  that  this  strategy  may  bring  in  the  long  run. 
Balance of payments crises, fiscal insolvency and accelerating inflation rates eventually 
take place. The welfare loss of the workers as a consequence of populist cycles usually 
overcomes the transitory benefits of the beginning of the episodes, in a process also known 
in  the  literature  as  “naive  distributivism”.  The  artificial  increases  of  real  wages  render 
strong internal and external imbalances that worsen the already problematic situation of the 
workers (Bresser-Pereira and Nakano 2003, pg.16). 
Some authors have studied populism episodes in Latin America. Sachs (1991) analyses 3 
cycles for the period 1970-1990: Chile from 1970 to 1973, Brazil from 1985 to 1987 and 
Peru  from  1985-1987.  In  all  of  these  episodes  the  traditional  populist  elements  can  be 
observed: large fiscal deficits, exchange rate overvaluation, balance of payments crises and 
raising inflation. In all cases, GDP growth accelerates in the first moment followed by 
strong recessive adjustments. The exchange rate appreciates, increasing the probability of 
an external crisis. Salvador Allende in the period 1971-1973, José Sarney from 1985-1988 
and  Alan  Garcia  from  1985-1988  have  all  practiced  in  their  own  ways  this  kind  of 
economic policy. Sachs goes further and argues that this kind of populism is one of the 
factors behind the chronic inflation processes of Latin America, “economic populism helps 
explaining the fact that in 1987 there was no less than 5 countries in Latin America with 
inflation rates above three digit levels (Argentina, Brasil, México, Nicaragua and Peru)” 
(Sachs 1991, pg.126). 
Exchange rate overvaluation was also largely used in Latin America’s ISI past to promote 
industrialization, working as an indirect tax on exported commodities. Although fruitful in   4 
the  beginning,  after  the  process  was  consolidated,  especially  within  manufactures,  the 
strategy became counterproductive. By hurting competitiveness, it made it harder for Latin 
American  countries  to  gain  market  shares  in  international  markets.  The  more  recent 
appreciation  cycles  of  the  Southern  Cone  stabilization  programs,  Chile,  Urugay  and 
Argentina, have also had very negative consequences for the development of a dynamic 
tradeables  sector  in  the  region  (Fishlow  2004[1985],  pg.228,  see  also  Díaz-Alejandro 
1991[1981], pg.92). 
In fact, the regional experiences of stabilization in the end of the 70s in Latin America 
would  anticipate  the  events  of  the  90s.  “The  so-called  ‘Southern  Cone  liberalization 
experiments’ combined financial and trade reforms with macroeconomic systems involving 
pre-set exchange rates and a passive monetary policy. The reforms included liberalization 
and  deregulation  of  capital  flows,  liberalization  of  the  local  financial  market  and  open 
trade. The pre-set exchange rates (called “tablitas”) were intended to bring down inflation. 
These policy experiments led to financial and trade liberalization and deregulation in the 
context  of  a  fixed,  appreciated  exchange  rate.  [Fanelli  and  Frenkel  (1993)  and  Frenkel 
(2002)]. The experiments had the same confluence of local conditions and booms in capital 
flows that can be seen in the critical cases in the 1990s” (Damill and Frenkel 2003, pg.4). 
The crises of the Southern Cone experiments were very similar to the developments that 
were later observed in the crises in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in 90s. 
Mexico is a good example of patterns of exchange rate polices in Latin America. Two cases 
of significant real exchange rate appreciations in the last 20 years, 1978-1982 and 1990-
1994 resulted in balance of payments crises in 1982 and 1994 that looked very much the 
same. Dornbusch et al (1995), for example, compares the Mexican case with the Chilean 
one after the debt crisis and put great emphasis on the exchange rate policy followed in 
Chile as being responsible for its success as compared to Mexico’s failure in the 90s (see 
Dornbusch et al 1995, pgs.257-258). He also analyses the cases of Brazil and Argentina in 
the  90s,  alerting  by  that  time  that  a  currency  crisis  was  probable  in  both  countries, 
recommending Brazil to devalue and Argentina to stick to its currency board until a price 
deflation would be able to bring about a real exchange rate correction (Dornbusch et al 
1995, pgs.262-263). He also highlights two previous appreciation cycles in both countries 
that were corrected without a major currency crisis: Brasil 1987-1990 in the pre Collor 
period  with  an  appreciation  of  the  order  of  54%  and  Argentina  with  Martínez  de  Hoz 
between 1979-1980 with an appreciation of approximately 60% (see also Frenkel 2003). 
Chile is an interesting case. After the 1982 crisis, the authorities seem to have learned from 
the problems of overvaluation. French-Davis (2004) discusses the evolution of exchange 
rate policy in Chile during the last 30 years. After analyzing the influence of the reforms of 
the 70s and 80s in Chilean exports, he highlights the importance of the changing stance of 
exchange rate policy after the debt crisis. In the 70s and 80s, Chile went through two long 
cycles of appreciation because of populism and stabilization that hindered export growth. In 
spite of trade openness and of policies aiming at export promotion, the exchange rate levels   5 
inhibited the growth of external sales. After the second reform in the 80s, the devaluation of 
the currency contributed significantly to an export boom. Since then until the middle of the 
90s, the Central Bank of Chile adopted a more interventionist stance in the exchange rate 
market,  trying  to  avoid  strong  appreciations  against  the  most  important  trade  partners 
(Ffrench-Davis 2004, pg.205). Montiel (2003, pg.427) draws attention to the superiority of 
the Chilean strategy as compared, for example, to the episodes of crises in Mexico and 
Thailand in the 90s. Cardoso (2003) argues that the exchange rate policy style in Chile for 
the recent years is much more close to the South Korean strategy, which maybe helping its 
growth record.  
Argentina is the paradigmatic case of currency appreciation and crisis in the nineties. After 
the successful implementation of the currency board and the stabilization program in the 
beginning of the 90s, the real exchange rate level became increasingly appreciated, as the 
dollar  got  stronger.  After  the  Brazilian  devaluation  in  1999,  the  peso  appreciated  even 
more. Indeed, the most significant cases of appreciation in Latin America in the 90s are to 
be found within three stabilization programs:  Mexico 1987, Argentina 1991 and  Brazil 
1994 (see Mussa 2000, pg.44 for a discussion). An exchange rate anchor, amongst other 
policies,  caused  severe  appreciations,  especially  in  Mexico  and  Argentina,  that  brought 
about three external crises: Mexico in 1994, Brazil in 1999 and Argentina in 2001 (Frenkel 
2002 and Frenkel et al 1996).  
The Chilean stabilization plan at the end of the 70s shows a very similar pattern when 
compared to these cases. After its implementation, a massive appreciation of the Chilean 
peso took place, leading, together with other factors, to external crisis in the beginning of 
the 80s. The four episodes looked very much like the populist cycles mentioned above, 
except  for  the  fact  that  Mexico  and  Chile  had  fiscal  policy  under  control.  There  was 
initially strong GDP growth and real wages, consumption and imports increased. External 
debt built up until a balance of payments crisis brought about a big nominal devaluation. 
Calvo and Vegh (1994) identify 7 stabilization plans with exchange rate anchors and real 
appreciations in Latin America for the period 1970-1993. The cases of appreciation show 
up in very distinct exchange rate regimes, i.e. in the tablita systems of the late 70s and the 
currency board in Argentina in the early 90s. 
Episode  Period  Real Appreciation 
Argentine tablita  1979.1-1980.4  46.3% 
Chilean tablita  1978.1-1982.1  28.8% 
Uruguayan tablita  1978.4-1982.3  48.2% 
Argentine Austral  1985.3-1986.3  4.6% 
Brazilian Cruzado  1986.2-1986.4  9.3% 
Mexico 1987  1988.1-1992.4  36.6% 
Argentine Convertibility  1991.2-1992.4  20.2% 
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All financial crises of the 90s in Latin America and Asia seem to have been related to 
overvaluation problems. Palma (2003), for example, analyses three routes to financial crisis 
in developing countries since the debt crisis of the 80s. In the first, represented by the 
financial liberalization and stabilization processes of Chile in 1975-1982, Mexico 1987-
1994 and Argentina 1990-2000, there was an important increase of private sector credit, 
bubbles in asset markets, a boom of imports and exchange rate appreciation. In the second 
route, followed by Brazil, the attempt to avoid the errors of route 1, created a new path for a 
crisis.  The  sterilization  of  capital  inflows  together  with  high  interest  rates  to  avoid  a 
consumption boom and a loose fiscal policy stance took the public debt dynamics out of 
control. In the third route, mainly taken by South Korea, in the period 1988-1996, the fall of 
electronic  components’  prices  in  the  international  markets  and  the  competition  with 
emerging China caused a collapse on Korean companies’ profit margins. In search for new 
sources of finance, they started to contract short-term external debt that eventually led the 
country to a crisis.  
Malaysia and Thailand took a combination of routes 1 and 3 in the period 1988-1996. They 
also went through losses of profits as a consequence of the conditions in the international 
markets for electronics and booms in the asset markets, but they didn’t go through increases 
in consumption imports and strong appreciation cycles. In the case of Brazil, one can also 
observe signs of route 1 in the real exchange rate appreciation and the increase in imports 
and consumption. In all of the routes, high current account deficits together with the sudden 
stops of capital inflows led the countries to a crisis. In the Asian cases, the deficits were 
largely related to investment financing, as opposed to the Latin American cases where the 
deficits were related to consumption financing with strong real exchange rate appreciations. 
Except for the case of Brazil, with a strong component of public debt financing, all other 
routes led to a crisis because of private consumers’, banks’ and companies’ indebtedness. 
Easterly (2001) builds an index of levels of real exchange rates against the US dollar based 
on consumer prices differentials and nominal exchange rates for developed and developing 
countries from 1960 to 1999 (World Bank Macroeconomic database). The graph below 
shows the behavior of real exchange rate levels based on Easterly (2001) calculations for 
some  of  the  principal  cycles  of  appreciation  in  Latin  America:  the  populist  episodes 
analyzed by Sachs (1991), the cases of financial liberalization analyzed by Palma (2003), 
and the cases discussed by Dornbusch et al (1995). When comparing the evolution of East 
and Southeast Asian and Latin American currency levels in the 90s, one can see that cycles 
of appreciations were much stronger for the latter. South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia had 
some currency appreciation in 1995 and 1996, but to a lesser extent than in the Argentinean 
and Mexican cases. 
 
 














Goldfajn  and  Valdes  (1996)  analyze  several  appreciation  episodes  for  developed  and 
developing countries from 1960 to 1994. A cycle is characterized as a departure from some 
notion of PPP equilibrium exchange rate, based on a basket of trade partners’ currencies. 
The authors find some interesting results. The appreciation cycles usually take more time to 
develop, as compared to the abrupt nominal devaluations that follow them. Fixed regimes 
are  much  more  prone  to  appreciation  and  most  of  the  episodes  found  by  the  authors 
happened  after  the  beginning  of  the  80s.  They  conclude  that,  in  most  cases,  the 
appreciations were corrected by nominal devaluations, which brought about high costs in 
terms of employment and income loss. For cases where the real exchange rate went further 
than 25% from the measured equilibrium, there were almost no cases of corrections without 
nominal  devaluations.  There  were  no  cases  at  all  where  currencies  went  over  35%  of 
appreciation and were corrected towards the equilibrium position by changes in prices and 
wages. 
From  Easterly’s  (2001)  database  it  is  possible  to  build  a  simple  routine  to  detect 
appreciations cycles in Latin America and Asia against the US dollar from 1970 until 1999. 
The routine enables us to compare aspects of exchange rate management in both regions. If 
we  define  a  cycle  as  an  episode  of  an  average  real  exchange  rate  x%  higher  than  the 
preceding n years and search the database, we can find important differences between Latin 
America and Asia. For 3 years with an average appreciation of 30% as compared to the 
base year, we find 16 years in which seems to be 9 cycles for Latin America and 4 base 
years for probably 2 cycles in Asia for a set of 10 countries in each region. If we extend the 
cycle in 1 year, still with a 30% cut off, we find 24 base years in what seems to be 11 
cycles for Latin America and 5 base years with still 2 cycles for Asia. When relaxing the 
restrictions of the cycle to 15% of appreciation over a 3 years average, we find 59 cases for 
Latin America and 25 for Asia.  
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Export-led growth in East and Southeast Asia 
The eight most dynamic economies of Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, grew in per capita terms at a 5,5% rate from 1965 
until 1990. In the 90s, despite the Asian crisis, their average growth rate was still higher 
than that of Latin American countries. More recently, China and India have been showing 
an Asian growth style. There are still today some controversies regarding the causes of the 
so-called East Asian miracle. The debate is mainly related to the role of the State in the 
development  of  these  economies.  The  World  Bank  and  its  affiliates  highlight  the 
importance of “market friendly polices” in the successful strategy of those countries and 
point to, in a somewhat contradictory manner, the problem of “crony capitalism” as one of 
the principal causes of the recent Asian financial crisis. The critics, namely Amsden (1989), 
Wade (1990), Rodrik (1994) and Chang (2003) see a well managed developmental state at 
the base of their success and focus on financial liberalization as the main cause of the crisis 
in the 90s. 
There seems to be some convergence among the authors regarding one aspect of macro 
management that resulted in higher stability and growth for these economies: competitive 
exchange rates. Rodrik (1994), for example, criticizes what he calls the export fetishism 
present  in  the  World  Bank  (1993)  report  that  analyzes  the  East  Asian  Miracle,  but 
recognizes  the  importance  of  competitive  exchange  rates  in  the  development  of  these 
countries (Rodrik 1994, pg.37). According to Williamson (1999), the East Asian economies 
have managed their currencies far better than Latin American and African countries. “They 
have not crucified their economies by misconceived attempts to use the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor. They have not allowed their currencies to become so overvalued, either by 
keeping their exchanges rates fixed in the face of differential inflation or by allowing them 
to float up too much, as to jeopardize export growth” (Williamson 1999, pg.331). 
The World Bank has dedicated lots of space in his famous 1993 report to understand the 
role  of  exchange  rate  policies  in  the  East  Asian  development.  An  undervalued  real 
exchange rate, it is supposed, had a most important role in developing a dynamic tradeable 
sector in the region, which contributed to the accumulation of capital and technological 
innovation. This was one of the pillars of the so-called export-led growth model of the East 
Asian miracle. “Several high performing Asian economies government used exchange rate 
policies  to  offset  the  adverse  impact  of  trade  liberalizations  on  producers  of  import 
substitutes. A few went beyond this objective, however, and used deliberately undervalued 
exchange rates to assist exporters. In these instances, exchange rate policy and the fiscal 
and monetary goals to carry it out became a part of an overall export-push strategy. Taiwan, 
China,  is  the  most  notable  example  of  this,  but  Korea  and  Indonesia  also  deliberately 
undervalued their currencies to boost exports” (World Bank 1993, pg.125). 
The  report  analyses  three  cases  of  heavy  intervention  with  an  eye  on  external 
competitiveness. The high current account surpluses in Taiwan from 1984 until 1987 (on 
the average 16% of GDP with a peak of 20% in 1986) resulted in part from strong efforts   9 
by the Taiwanese Government to keep the currency depreciated. An appreciation would 
have canceled out the surpluses, hindering the export-led growth strategy. South Korea also 
made  heavy  interventions  in  their  currency  market  in  the  middle  of  the  80s  avoiding 
appreciations,  accumulating  reserves  and  keeping  the  won  competitive.  The  Indonesian 
ruppiah devaluation in 1978 was clearly a protective measure while done in a time of no 
balance of payments restrictions. The worsening of external accounts in 1982 had a much 
smaller impact in the Indonesian economic performance in part as a result from the strategy 
of the late 70s (World Bank 1993, pg.127). About the High Performing Asian Economies 
(HPAEs) and their development strategies contrasted to the African and Latin American 
experiences, the Bank highlights the formers’ changing of focus to external markets already 
in  the  70s.  This  would  have  helped  them  to  increase  competitiveness  and  productivity 
(World Bank 1993, pg.22). 
Indonesia is one of the most successful examples of avoiding Dutch Diseases. In spite of 
being very rich in oil reserves, the country was able to develop a meaningful tradeable 
sector,  based  on  the  competitive  production  of  manufactures.  The  real  devaluations  of 
1978, 1983 and 1986 proved to be very efficient in stimulating the non-oil export-based 
sector (Hill 2000, pg.16). Although not following  an export led  growth strategy strictu 
sensu (exports were always around 30% of GDP), the development of a non-traditional 
tradeable  sector  was  very  important  to  Indonesian  growth  track  record.  Gelb  (1988) 
compares the impacts of the two oil shocks on oil rich  economies and argues that the 
exchange rate policy  followed by  Indonesia was one of the main  causes of its notable 
achievement in the 80s. Nigeria, Algeria, Trindad and Ecuador are amongst the cases of 
strong  real  appreciations  followed  by  the  shocks.  By  destroying  the  non-traditional 
tradeable sector of these economies, the appreciated currency levels were one of the main 
causes of the stagnation of technological development. 
Other studies also highlight the pro-competitive strategy of exchange rate policy in Asia. 
Dornbusch and Park (1999) point out to some Asian countries that would have followed a 
real exchange rate targeting strategy to promote exports in the 80s and 90s. In the case of 
Singapore, the monetary authority besides targeting price stability “is also watchful of the 
impact of the exchange rate on the country export competitiveness. This targeting renders 
interest rate policy subordinate to exchange rate policy” (Dornbusch and Park 1999, pg.27). 
In the case of Malaysia, “Bank Negara manages the ringgit to support the nation’s export 
competitiveness  and  maintain  monetary  stability.  Occasionally  it  administers  exchange 
controls on behalf of the Malaysian government” (Dornbusch and Park 1999, pg.28).  In 
South Korea, “the Bank of Korea often intervenes in the interbank market through the sale 
or purchase of the US dollar. It is conjectured that the main purpose of the intervention in 
the foreign exchange market is to stabilize the real effective exchange rate of the won in 
order to maintain the price competitiveness of  South Korean exports. The central bank 
intervention  has  been  effective  due  to  the  thinness  of  the  domestic  foreign  exchange 
market,  where  the  average  volume  of  daily  turnover  in  1995  was  only  $2  billion” 
(Dornbusch and Park 1999, pg.32).    10 
Rhee and Song (1999, pg.80) also acknowledge this fact when discussing the strategy of 
the monetary authorities in South Korea regarding exchange rate policy in the last 20 years. 
In  the  middle  of  the  80s,  the  country  went  through  an  appreciation  cycle  of  its  real 
exchange rate due to good results in the export sector. The intervention of the Central Bank 
was asymmetric, being more aggressive to avoid appreciations than depreciations in order 
to promote exports (Rhee and Song 1999, pg.80). In the beginnig of the 90s, the monetary 
authorities were at pains to avoid apreciation of the won because of strong capital inflows. 
The central bank intervened heavily. In 1993 it bought more than 1.8 billion dollars only in 
one day (Rhee and Song 1999, pg.80). When analysing Asian countries, Barrell et al (1999) 
also  identify  a  pro-competitivenss  exchange  rate  policy  in  South  Korea,  Taiwan  and 
Thailand (Barrell et al 1999, pg.271). 
China is today a very good example of the Asian style of exchange rate management.  In its 
1993  report,  the  World  Bank  highlights  a  deliberated  policy  of  exchange  rate 
undervaluation in the Chinese growth strategy since the end of the 70s. “China’s export 
push has included currency devaluations and such export incentives as tax breaks, foreign 
exchange retention privileges, and duty-free imports, all utilized by the HPAEs” (World 
Bank 1993, pg.59). China’s stock of capital in the tradeable sector is growing steadily due 
to its strategy of maintaining an undervalued real exchange rate level, following the steps of 
South Korea and Japan. An undervalued exchange rate boosts exports, inhibits consume 
and  thus  favors  the  accumulation  of  a  world-class  capital  stock  in  the  production  of 
tradeables. A free floating regime, with heavy capital inflows, would balance the Chinese 
trade and current accounts with the appreciation of their currency. This appreciation would 
stimulate consumption and hinder investment in the tradeable sector because of the change 
in relative prices. It is important to acknowledge here that this kind of intervention in the 
exchange rate market creates a favorable distortion to growth. A revaluation of the Chinese 
currency would stop this process. It is not clear if a free floating regime would be the best 
option for China today.  
Dooley et al (2003) identify three distinct regions in today’s global markets in terms of 
economic policy. The center of the system, the US economy, doesn’t have much of a worry 
with the level of its currency as it can issue the reserve currency for the global economy. 
Their huge current account deficits, meaning an excess of absorption over income, are 
financed with savings from the so-called current account region, basically the East and 
Southeast Asian countries. Among them, especially China today, the strategy is to export 
savings to the US economy by means of a level of production greater than their needs of 
absorption.  These  countries  grow  with  negative  foreign  savings.  The  capital  account 
regions, mostly Europe and Latin America, opted for financial instead of trade integration 
to  the  world  economy.  In  their  strategy,  a  permanent  surplus  in  the  current  and  trade 
accounts is not a priority. 
As surpluses in the current and trade accounts are goals for the current account region, their 
basic policy is to maintain a relatively depreciated currency with heavy interventions in the   11 
foreign exchange markets. In some cases, as in India, China and Malaysia, capital controls 
are  also  employed  for  the  task.  The  difficulty  is  to  avoid  appreciations  because  of 
speculative pressures on the nominal exchange rate or excessive monetary expansion due to 
heavy  capital  inflows.  In  the  most  controlled  cases,  the  access  to  external  funds  is 
prohibited for domestic investors and the government intervenes strongly in the foreign 
exchange  market  acquiring  reserves  and  investing  them  in  US  assets,  especially 
government  bonds.  For  countries  in  the  capital  account  regions,  the  current  account 
surpluses eventually turn into currency appreciation, reducing or canceling out the export 
stimulus.  The  return  on  international  financial  assets  for  domestic  and  international 
investors is a priority and, usually, these countries have no capital controls and a floating 
exchange rate regime. 
In historical terms, this financial arrangement reproduces the post-war international system. 
In the original Bretton Woods scheme, the center of the system was the US economy and 
Japan and Europe the periphery. The arrangement for the reconstruction of the economies 
destroyed in the war followed the pattern observed today. Following an export-led growth 
strategy,  the  countries  destroyed  in  the  war  could  rebuild  their  capital  stock.  Fixed 
exchange rates and capital controls were very important at that time, and it is interesting to 
note the capital controls were mandatory, not optional. Along with economic development, 
there came a lobby against capital controls that was eventually successful in the beginning 
of the 70s. Industrial development led to financial development that finally dismounted the 
Bretton  Woods  arrangement.  According  to  Dooley  et  al  (2003),  more  recently,  the 
periphery has been reloaded by the Asian countries and we observe today something very 
close to what happened from the 50s until the 70s. An open issue here is for how long the 
US deficits will be sustained. The common vision represent by the so-called Washington 
consensus fears an abrupt adjustment that would bring severe consequences for the US and 
the  world  economy.  In  the  revived  Bretton  Woods  analyses,  this  adjustment  would  be 
gradual and could last for long. 
This global  arrangement is functional for the development of East and Southeast Asia, 
which  have  been  growing  permanently,  incorporating  labor  force  into  their  formal 
economies. China would still have at least 200 million workers ready to go into the labor 
market. The growth strategy of the current account region meets the needs of the American 
growth cum debt strategy. Following this logic, the appreciated dollar against the Asian 
currencies means that the US economy continues to finance its growth and consumption 
with foreign savings from Asia. The Asian Central Banks can pursue this kind of policy in 
two ways: either by buying reserves in free floating regimes or using capital controls as 
China does.  
 
 
   12 
Trends for the evolution of real exchange rate levels in Asia and Latin America 
Dollar (1992) builds an index of exchange rate distortion or “outward orientation” for 95 
developing countries from 1976 until 1985. Based on Summers and Heston (1985) data, the 
author compares relative price levels between more than 90 countries and the United States. 
He makes an adjustment for income per capita levels in order to correct for the Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson effect, which relates per capita income increases with appreciations of 
real exchange rates. In his index of outward orientation, a high price level means a more 
appreciated  exchange  rate  level  when  compared  to  the  US  economy  and  more 
protectionism with higher tariff levels; a lower price level means a lower exchange rate 
level or less protectionism. Rodrik (1994) criticizes Dollar’s (1992) work, arguing that his 
index is not an appropriated measure of protectionism levels, being much more adequate as 
an  exchange  rate  distortion  index.  The  results  of  Dollar  (1992)  point  to  a  relatively 
undervalued level for East and Southeast Asian currencies when compared to the Latin 
American  and  African  ones  (Dollar  1992,  pg.539,  for  an  analysis  of  overvaluation  of 
African currencies see Ghura and Greenes 1993). 
Benaroya and Janci (1999) compare levels of real exchange rates for 61 countries for the 
years of 1993 and 1998 based on PPP deviations. Their results are in line with Dollar’s 
(1992), including the case of China, and show that, on the average, Asian currencies were 
more depreciated than the others in the set. “Most Asian countries’ exchange rates also 
appear  undervalued,  but  much  less  than  in  previous  studies  like  Lafay  (1996).  This  is 
particularly the case for Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong and (up to 40 percent) Malaysia. 
Exceptions are the Phillipines and South Korea. The results are close to those of Barrell et 
al (1998) for the four countries they have studied. If one considers that Asian currencies are 
informally pegged to the dollar (see Bénassy 1996), their “own” undervaluation should be 
measured relative to the US dollar and is, in general, less than 20%” (Benaroya and Janci 
1999, pg.237).  
Li Lian Ong (1997) works with the Big Mac index to measure exchange rate positions for 
34 countries. She calculates under and overvaluations against the US dollar based on the 
prices of the Big Mac, “the perfect universal commodity”, for all of these countries. She 
finds that currencies of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries 
were  generally  undervalued  against  the  US  dollar.  The  Malaysian  ringgit,  Singaporean 
dollar and Thai baht were undervalued by about 45, 15 and 30 percent in April 1997. The 
Indonesian ruppiah was undervalued by 24 percent and the Philippine peso by 39 percent 
(Ong 1998, pg.89). This finding goes against common wisdom that the Asian currencies 
were somewhat appreciated right before the crisis in 1997. Surprisingly enough, still in the 
first semester of 1997 McDonald’s announced a decrease in the price of the Big Mac that 
put the Asian currencies in a somewhat overvalued position measured by the index. Besides 
the usual comparisons based on PPP Big Mac prices, the author builds an index to adjust 
for  the  so-called  productivity  bias  resulting  from  the  Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis. She deflates exchange rate variations by a productivity increase component,   13 
measured with real GDP levels for each country as a proxy. The results show again relative 
undervaluation for the East Asian countries, especially for the ASEAN. Ong (1997) shows 
that on the average, from 1986 to 1994, the Malaysian ringgit, the Singaporean dollar and 
the Thai baht were respectively undervalued by 53%, 26% and 19% against the US dollar. 
Rajapatirana and Athukorala (2003) analyze the impact of capital inflows on real exchange 
rates levels for 8 countries in Asia and Latin America for the period 1985-2000. They show 
that the appreciation of the Asian currencies, especially in the cases of China and India (for 
a discussion of real exchange rate targeting in India, see Patel 1997), against their trade 
partners  were  much  lower  than  the  ones  observed  in  Latin  America.  For  these  latter 
countries, they find a range of variation from 14,7% to 43,5% in currency appreciation. 
Meanwhile, the Asian currency appreciations range from 2,3% to 11,2%, the latter value 
observed  in  Philippines  with  the  highest  appreciation  in  the  region  (Rajapatirana  and 
Athukorala 2003, pg.625). According to the authors, for each percentage point of capital 
flow increase, except for foreign direct investment (FDI), ones observes a 1.7 percentage 
point increase in the appreciation of Latin American currencies as compared to only 0.56 in 
the Asian cases. Interestingly enough, they find a negative correlation between FDI and 
currency appreciation. The higher the FDI, the more undervalued the currency. This result 
could be explained by what the authors call the tradeable bias present in FDI. These kind of 
investments are usually located in the tradeable sector of the economies, which demands a 
more competitive exchange rate.  
Sachs et al (1996) analyzes the causes of the Mexican crisis in 1995 and its effects on 20 
emerging economies. They find 3 relevant factors that help explaining the shortcomings of 
the crisis in these countries: real exchange rate overvaluation, low reserves level and a 
weak financial sector. Economies that showed these 3 characteristics, other than Mexico, 
suffered  much  more  strongly  the  Tequila  effect:  Argentina  and  Philippines.  When 
comparing exchange rate levels against a basket of currencies for these countries for the 
period 1990-1994 based on the preceding years of 1986-1989, they find again relatively 
appreciated currencies in Latin America as compared to Asia, with the exception of Chile 
and Colombia. In Asia, the exception is again the Philippines, “a striking fact in the data is 
that  the  Latin  American  countries  experienced  sharper  real  appreciations  than  did  East 
Asian economies” (Sachs et al 1996, pg.4). When analyzing the debt crisis in the beginning 
of the 80s, Sachs (1986, pg.541) also finds a relative appreciation of the Latin American 
currencies as compared to East and Southeast Asian ones for the period 1979-81 against 
1976-1978, with the exception of Brasil and Peru.  
The World  Bank macro database is based on Easterly’s  (2001)  work  as we mentioned 
before. The author builds a series of real exchange rate levels for developed and developing 
countries against the US dollar from 1960 until 1999. Using the traditional methodology, he 
calculates  (Domestic  CPI)/(Exchange  Rate  Domestic  Currency  per  Dollar*US  CPI).  To 
make the series fairly comparable, he benchmarks them for each country by adjusting their 
level such that the average for 1976-85 equals Dollar’s (1992) calculation (Easterly 2001,   14 
pg.9). The methodology tries to transform the data so that a rough PPP comparison between 
countries can be made based on Dollar’s (1992) work. A value of 100 in Easterly’s series 
means  a  PPP  equilibrium  position  adjusted  for  the  real  per  capita  level  of  the  country 
between the years 1976-1985 as measured by Dollar (1992). A real exchange rate that is 
higher than 100 means that some overvaluation is observed. 
Comparing the series for 10 countries from Latin America and Asia, together with our own 
calculation of the Brazilian series for the period 1970-1985, we can observe the trends in 
exchange rates for both regions in the last 30 years. The average for the 10 Latin American 
currency levels in the period is 104.5, which means 4,5% above the equilibrium PPP level 
against the US dollar. For the countries in Asia, the average real exchange rate level is 82.7, 
meaning  17,7  percentage  points  below  PPP  equilibrium.  The  graph  below  based  on 
(Easterly  2001)  data  shows  that  the  levels  of  Latin  American  currencies  looked  rather 
overvalued  when  compared  to  the  Asian  ones  from  1970  until  1999.  Argentina,  Peru, 
Brasil, Uruguay and Mexico showed a trend of depreciation in the 80s and appreciation in 
the 90s, Bolivia and Paraguay showed appreciation in the 80s and depreciation in the 90s 
and  finally  Chile,  Venezuela  and  Colombia  currencies  showed  a  persistent  trend  of 
depreciation along the years. In Asia, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore went through 
some appreciation in the last years. All other countries of the set, India, Thailand, Malaysia, 











It is important to note that the appreciations in Latin America are much more a case of ill 
driven  populist  and  stabilization  policies  than  a  good  result  of  trade  surpluses. 
Appreciations in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore are usually related to their successful 
export strategy and repeated current accounts surpluses that put pressure on the nominal 
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exchange  rate.  In  this  sense,  they  can  be  seen  as  a  good  sign,  reflecting  increases  in 
productivity  and  a  good  performance  in  the  export  sector.  Taiwan,  South  Korea  and 
Singapore increased their relative per capita income to the US economy from 10% in the 
end of the 60s to more than 60% at the end of the 90s. Singapore achieved a level of 80% 
of relative income per capita of the US economy in 1999. In 1995 the current account 
surplus in Singapore peaked at 14% of GDP and was almost totally used to buy reserves 
that, at the time, stood at 67 U$ billions for a population of 3 million people.    
Easterly (2001) doesn’t take into account variations in per capita income levels amongst 
countries from 1970-1999 when building his index. One possible way of correcting for this 
problem  is  to  deflate  Easterly  (2001)  real  exchange  rate  levels  by  the  variation  of  the 
relative  per  capita  income  of  each  country  and  the  United  States,  which  works  as  a 
benchmark for the whole series. In a first approximation, we could consider that the relative 
increase in the real per capita income of a country as compared to the US economy should 
be reflected in the appreciation of its currency (Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect). If the 
real exchange rate calculated by Easterly doesn’t show much of an appreciation, we can 
conclude that the exchange rate level of this economy is undervalued as compared to the 
relative productivity increase observed. Following this procedure, we can build a new index 
of overvaluation (for similar works see Dollar 1992, Ong 1997 and Benaroya 1999).  
 
RER* = St+s / [(GDPi/GDPUS)t+s / (GDPi/GDPUS)t )] 
 
Using an index that assumes a 100% percent conversion of relative per capita income levels 
into the real exchange rate, we find even broader differences between Latin America and 
Asia. The graph below shows these comparisons using our index as a measure of deviations 
from a Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson rule; the higher the per capita income of a country the 



















The average distortion index for the period 1970-1999 is 79.67 for the Asian countries and 
113.79  for  the  Latin  American  countries.  In  the  group  of  Asian  currencies,  with  the 
exception of the Phillipines, all countries show a clear tendency of undervaluation in the 
80s and 90s. For the Latin American economies, the distortion index basically repeats the 
behavior  of  Easterly  measures  presented  above.  Peru  and  Uruguay  show  a  permanent 
tendency of appreciation. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico show a depreciation trend in the 
80s and a appreciation trend in the 90s, Bolivia and Venezuela show appreciations in the 
80s  and  depreciation  in  the  90s,  and  finally,  Paraguay,  Colombia  and  Chile  show  a 
permanent trend of depreciation in the last 20 years.  
 
Conclusions 
When discussing the impacts of the debt crisis in Latin America and Asia in the beginning 
of the 80s, Sachs (1986) concludes that the superior adjustment of the Asian countries took 
place mainly because of their better exchange rate and trade regimes. Except for the case of 
Phillipines,  none  of  the  Asian  high  performing  economies  (HPAEs)  has  defaulted  on 
external debt, a very different situation as compared to Latin America. Sachs argues that 
these two regions had 3 common characteristics and 1 distinct, which was responsible for 
their  rather  smooth  transition  in  the  debt  crisis.  In  terms  of  external  debt,  the  Asian 
countries had practically the Latin American level. South Korea, for example, had a total 
external debt over GDP coefficient of 27,6% in 1981, higher than the Brazilian level of 
26,1% for the same year. When it comes to terms of trade, the author argues that some of 
the  Asian  countries  have  had  even  worst  shocks  than  the  Latin  American  countries. 
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Regarding state intervention, Sachs argues that  both regions went through a process of 
some form of State led development. 
The great difference between these two macro regions is then to be found on “trade regime 
and  exchange  rate  management”.  While  Latin  America  focused  on  an  inward-looking 
industrialization strategy with a strong bias for currency appreciations, East Asian countries 
pursued an export led growth strategy, with heavy stimulus for the export sector through 
subsidies and competitive exchange rates. The reason for the superior adjustment of East 
and  Southeast  Asia  in  the  debt  crisis  would  then  be  in  the  existence  of  an  ample  and 
dynamic tradeable sector, capable of producing the so needed hard currency when the day 
of the reckoning came. This difference can be seen, according to Sachs (1986), when we 
compare the exports over external debt ratio for both regions in the beginning of the 80s. 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand had on average an index of 0,821 in 1981 
as compared to an average index of 2,715 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela in the same year.  
In  conclusion,  the  story  presented  here  could  be  summarized  as  a  recurrent  trend  of 
appreciation cycles in Latin American currencies and stable and depreciated levels of real 
exchange rates in East and Southeast Asia, especially after the end of 70s. While Latin 
American countries went through their well-known populist and stabilization episodes, East 
and Southeast Asian countries focused on their export-led growth strategy with a permanent 
stimulus for the export sector, avoiding episodes of strong appreciations. While the former 
have used exchange rates prominently as a populist or stabilization tool, the latter have used 
exchange rates in search for external demand, following their development strategy. By 
focusing on balanced fiscal policies and export promotion rather than import substitution, 
the East Asian countries “escaped important contradictions that afflicted many countries in 
Africa, South Asia and Latin America. In particular, they avoided reliance on high rates of 
inflation  and  the  resulting  overvalued  currencies  and  balance-of-payments  difficulties” 
(Fishlow and Gwin1994, pg.7). In this sense, the export promoting industrialization process 
(EPI) of East and Southeast Asia proved to be a much better strategy than Latin American 
import substitution industrialization (ISI). 
The evidence presented here points out to a recurrent undervaluation of Asian currencies 
when  compared  to  Latin  Americans,  especially  if  we  take  into  account  a  measure  of 
distortion  that  adjusts  the  exchange  rates  for  levels  of  income  and  productivity.  These 
results are in line with the empirical literature. As discussed at the beginning of the paper, 
competitive  exchange  rates  seem  to  have  been  an  important  factor  behind  East  and 
Southeast Asian success, notably when compared to African and Latin American failures in 
the last 20 years. We can of course find exceptions to the rule in both regions. In Latin 
America, the most important one is Chile that seems to have changed to an Asian stance of 
exchange rate management from the mid 80s to the mid 90s. In Asia, the exception is with 
the Phillipines, also known as the most Latin American of the Asian economies. As far as 
real exchange rate targeting is concerned, it is also important to acknowledge the fact that   18 
Latin American countries would have had much more difficulties than the Asian countries 
in targeting, even if they tried, because of their long tradition of high inflation and inertia.  
 
References 
ACEMOGLU, D., SIMON J. and JAMES R., (2002) "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic 
Symptoms: Volatility, Crisis and Growth," Cambridge MA, MIT.  
AMSDEN, A., H., (1989) Asia’s next Giant, South Korea and late industrialization, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
BENAROYA, F., and JANCI, D., (1999) "Measuring exchange rates misalignments with 
purchasing  power  parity  estimates”  in  Exchange  Rate  Policies  in  Emerging  Asian 
Countries, Stefan Collignon, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Yung Chul Park (eds.), Routledge, New 
York.  
BRESSER-PEREIRA,  L.,  C.,  and  NAKANO,  Y.,  (2003)  “Crescimento  com  Poupança 
Externa?”, Revista de Economia Política, 22(2) abril. 
_______________________  (2004a)  “Brazil’s  quasi-stagnation  and  the  growth  cum 
foreign savings strategy” paper to be published in the International Journal of Political 
Economy  (Ottawa  University),  volume  especial  editado  por  Alcino  Câmara  Neto  and 
Matias Vernengo. 
_______________________ (2004b) “Exchange rate, fix, float or manage it? Preface to 
Mathias  Vernengo,  ed.  (2004)  Financial  Integration  or  Dollarization:  No  Panacea. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, to be published in 2004. 
CALVO,  G.,  and  VEGH,  C.  (1994),  “Inflation  Stabilization  and  Nominal  Anchors”  in 
Approaches to exchange rate policy, FMI, Washington. 
CARDOSO,  E.,  (2003)  "Uma  perspectiva  macroeconômica  do  crescimento  Brasileiro: 
algumas comparações internacionais." in Paulo Roberto de Almeida and Rubens Barbosa, 
editores, O Brasil e os Estados Unidos num Mundo em Mutação. Washington DC. 
CAVALLO, D., F., COTTANI, J., A., and KAHN, M., S., (1990). “Real exchange rate 
behavior and economic  performance in  LDCs”  in Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 39, October: 61-76. 
CHANG, H., (2002) “The triumph of the Rentiers? The 1997 Korean crisis in historical 
perspective”,  in  International  Capital  Markets,  systems  in  transition,  John  Eatwell  and 
Lance Taylor (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
___________,(2003) “The East Asian development experience” in Rethinking Development 
Economics, Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Anthem Press. 
DÍAZ-ALEJANDRO,  C.  (1991)  “Planos  de  estabilização  no  Cone  Sul”,  in  Populismo 
Econômico:  ortodoxia,  desenvolvimentismo  e  populismo  na  América  Latina,  Bresser-
Pereira (org.), ed. Nobel, São Paulo, originalmente publicado em 1981. 
DOLLAR, D. (1992). “Outward-oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow More 
Rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985.” in Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 40: 523-44.   19 
DORNBUSCH,  R.,  and  PARK,  Y.,C.,  (1999)  “Flexibility  or  nominal  anchors?”,  in 
Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Asian Countries, Stefan Collignon, Jean Pisani-Ferry 
and Yung Chul Park (eds.), Routledge, New York.  
_______________,  GOLDFAJN,  I.,  and  VALDES,  R.  (1995)  “Currency  crises  and 
collapses”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Washington: Iss.2,  p. 219 (75 pp.) 
EASTERLY, W., (2001) “The Lost Decades: Developing Countries’ Stagnation in Spite of 
Policy Reform 1980-1998”, World Bank. 
FAJNZYLBER, P., LOAYZA, N., and CALDERÓN, C., (2002), "Economic Growth in 
Latin America and the Caribbean," Washington DC, The World Bank. 
FFRENCH-DAVIS, R., (2004) Entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad, tres 
décadas  de  política  econômica  em  Chile,  Siglo  Veintiuno  Editores,  Buenos  Aires, 
Argentina. 
FRENKEL, R.,  (2004) “Real exchange rate and employment in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico”, Cedes, Buenos Aires, paper presented to the G24. 
_____________ (2003) “Argentina: macroeconomic performance and crisis”, presented for 
the  Macroeconomic  Policy  Task  Force  of  the  International  Policy  Dialogue  (IPD), 
Columbia, New York. 
_____________ (2002) “Argentina, a decade of the convertibility regime” in Revista de 
Economia Política, vol.(22) n4(88), Outubro-Dezembro de 2002. 
____________, Damill, M., and Fanelli, J.,M., (1996) “De Mexico a Mexico: el desempenõ 
de la America Latina en los 90”, vol.(16) n4(64), Outubro-Dezembro de 2002. 
FISHLOW, A., (2004) “O estado da Economia latino-americana” in Desenvolvimento no 
Brasil  e  na  América  Latina,  uma  perspectiva  histórica,  ed.  Paz  e  Terra,  São  Paulo, 
publicação original [1985]. 
____________ and GWIN, C., (1994) “Lessons from the East Asian Experience: overview” 
in Miracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian experience, Albert Fishlow, Catherine 
Gwin, Stephan Haggard, Dani Rodrik and Robert Wade (eds.). 
GELB, A., H., (1988), Oil windfalls, blessing or curse? World Bank research publication. 
GOLDFAJN, I., and VALDES, R.(1996) “The aftermath of appreciations”, NBER working 
paper 5650, Cambridge, MA, July. 
GHURA,  D.,  and  GRENNES,  T.,  (1993)  “The  real  exchange  rate  and  macroeconomic 
performance in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of Development Economics 42, 155-174. 
HAUSMANN, R., PRITCHETT, L., and RODRIK, D., (2004), “Growth Accelerations”, 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Draft, April. 
HILL, H., (2000), The Indonesian Economy, Cambridge University press, Second edition, 
Cambridge. 
MONTIEL, P., (2003) “Domestic macroeconomic management in emerging economies: 
lessons  from  the  crises  of  the  nineties”  in  Macroeconomics  in  Emerging  Markets, 
Cambridge University Press. 
MUSSA, M., (2000), “Exchange Rate regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World”, IMF. 
ONG, L., L., (1997) “Burgernomics: the economics of the Big Mac standard” in Journal of 
International Money and Finances, vol.16, pp.865-78.   20 
___________(1998)  “Burgernomics  and  the  ASEAN  currency  crisis”  in  Journal  of  the 
Australian Society of Security Analysts” Autumn, pp.15-16. 
PALMA, G. (2003) “The three routes to financial crises: Chile, Mexico and Argentina [1]; 
Brazil [2], and Korea, Malaysia and Thailand [3]” in Rethinking Development Economics, 
Ha-Joon Chang (org.), Anthem Press. 
PATEL, U., R., (1997) “Some implications of real exchange rate targeting in India”, Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, India. 
POPOV, V., and POLTEROVICH, V., (2002) “Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
and long term growth”, New Economic School, Moscow, Russia, unpublished paper. 
RAJAPATIRANA,  S.,  and  ATHUKORALA,  P.,  (2003)  “Capital  inflows  and  the  real 
exchange rate: a comparative study of Asia and Latin America”, The World Economy, 
Oxford, April. 
RAZIN, O., and COLLINS, S. (1997) “Real Exchange Rate Misalignments and Growth”, 
forthcoming in Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka (eds.), International Economic Integration: 
Public Economics Perspectives, Cambridge University Press. 
RHEE, Y., and SONG, C., (1999) “Exchange rate policy and effectiveness of intervention: 
the case of South Korea”, in Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Asian Countries, Stefan 
Collignon, Jean Pisani-Ferry and Yung Chul Park (eds.), Routledge, New York.  
RODRIK,  D.,(2000)  “Exchange  Rate  Regimes  and  Institutional  Arrangements  in  the 
Shadow  of  Capital  Flows”,  paper  presented  on  a  conference  on  Central  Banking  and 
Sustainable development, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, August, 28-30, in honor of Tun 
Ismail Mohamed Ali. 
____________(1994) “King Kong meets Godzilla: the World Bank and The East Asian 
Miracle” in Miracle or Design? Lessons from the East Asian experience, Albert Fishlow, 
Catherine Gwin, Stephan Haggard, Dani Rodrik and Robert Wade (eds.). 
SACHS, J., (1985) “External debt and macroeconomic performance in Latin America and 
East Asia”, Brookings Papers on economic activity.2, 523-573. 
_________,(1991)  “Conflito  socialandpolíticas  populistas  na  América  Latina”,  in 
Populismo  Econômico:  ortodoxia,  desenvolvimentismo  e  populismo  na  América  Latina, 
Bresser-Pereira (org.), ed. Nobel, São Paulo. 
_________,  TORNELL,  A.,  and  VELASCO,  A.,  (1996)  “Financial  crises  in  emerging 
markets: The lessons from 1995”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Washington: 
Iss.1,  p. 147-215 (69 pp.). 
WADE, R., (1990) Governing the market, economic theory and the role of government in 
East Asian industrialization, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
WILLIAMSON, J., (1999) “The case for a common basket peg for East Asian currencies” 
in Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Asian Countries, Stefan Collignon, Jean Pisani-
Ferry and Yung Chul Park (eds.), Routledge, New York.  
________________ (2003) “Exchange rate policy and development”, presented in Initiative 
for Policy Dialogue Task Force on Macroeconomics, New York.  
WORLD  BANK  (1993)  The  East  Asian  Miracle,  economic  growth  and  public  policy, 
Oxford University Press, NY. 